We define an interpretation of modal languages with polyadic operators in modal languages that use monadic operators (diamonds) only. We also define a simulation operator which associates a logic Λ sim in the diamond language with each logic Λ in the language with polyadic modal connectives. We prove that this simulation operator transfers several useful properties of modal logics, such as finite/recursive axiomatizability, frame completeness and the finite model property, canonicity and first-order definability.
Introduction
Modern modal logic originated as a branch of philosophical logic in which the concepts of 'necessity' and 'possibility' were investigated by means of a single pair of dual, monadic operators (P and Q) that are added to a propositional or first order language. In subsequent years, modal logic has received attention as an attractive approach towards formalizing such diverse notions as time, knowledge, or action. Nowadays, modal logics are applied in various disciplines, ranging from economics to linguistics and computer science. Consequently, there is by now a large variety of modal languages, with an even greater wealth of interpretations. In particular, many applications require a framework consisting of a language with a family of modal connectives, and a semantics in which the associated accessibility relations are somehow related.
Because of this enormous diversity in appearance and applications, there is a need for unifying results in the mathematical theory of modal logics. Fortunately, this need has been recognized and addressed by modal logicians. Roughly speaking, one can distinguish two approaches in the literature on such unifying results in modal logic. One way is to abstract from the number and arity of the modal operators and develop the general theory of modal logic. This perspective was already taken in the classic paper Jónsson & Tarski [8] and followed by for instance Goldblatt [5] ; it also prevails in modern works such as the monograph Kracht [9] and the recent textbook Blackburn et alii [3] . A second direction is to compare various classes of modal logics, cf. Kracht & Wolter [10] for a survey. One can distinguish two research lines in this direction; transfer theory comprises investigations of the effect of extending modal languages with certain operators that are somehow related to the old ones. In the second line of research, to which the present paper forms a contribution, one studies simulations of one modal logic by another.
Let us briefly explain what a simulation is (a more precise definition is given in section 2). Suppose that we are dealing with two modal languages, L 1 and L 2 . A translation mapping L 1 -formulas to L 2 -formulas is called an interpretation if it meets certain uniformity conditions. Now we say that an L 2 -logic Λ 2 simulates an L 1 -logic Λ 1 with respect to the interpretation (·) t if for all formulas ϕ in L 1 we have that
A simulation is a function mapping L 1 -logics to simulating L 2 -logics; simulations can and have been used to derive results about (families of) L 1 -logics from results about L 2 -logics, and vice versa. Obviously, the more properties a simulation preserves or reflects, the more useful it is. Gödel's translation of intuitionistic logic in Grzegorczyk's logic, cf. [4] , provides a wellknown early example of a simulation. Important results in modal logic were obtained by Thomason in the early seventies, cf. [16, 17] . Thomason showed how polymodal logics (that is, normal modal logics in a language with a number of diamonds or unary modalities) can be simulated by monomodal ones, and applies this result to prove certain (negative) results concerning monomodal logics.
Thomason's approach was taken up and developed further in Kracht & Wolter [10, 11] . In the second paper, which was in fact written earlier, the authors show that normal monomodal logics can simulate normal polymodal logics, (equational theories of lattices) and non-normal monomodal logics. Concerning the first simulation operation, which is based on Thomason's ideas, Kracht and Wolter prove that several properties of modal logics are transferred; that is, they show for various properties P that the normal polymodal logic has property P if and only its simulating logic has P . Examples include various kinds of axiomatizability, canonicity, first-order definability and interpolation. Although the results in [11] are significant, they do not entirely justify the claim made in the paper's title that normal monomodal logics can simulate all others, since polyadic modal operators, which we will discuss in a moment, are not considered.
In their second paper [10] , Kracht and Wolter fill this gap by making a proposal for a general simulation of polyadic logics by monadic ones (interpretations of specific binary operators with unary ones were known for instance in algebraic logic). However, this article is a survey paper rather than a research report, and the authors confine themselves to a very rudimentary investigation of properties that are preserved or reflected by this simulation. To be precise, they only prove reflection of canonicity and first-order definability. As far as we know, the only other general interpretation of dyadic modalities by diamonds was developed in the context of categorial grammar, cf. Kurtonina [12] . The main result in this paper states that a certain simulation preserves Sahlqvist axiomatizability, but no other properties of logics are considered. In other words, the question whether there is an adequate simulation of polyadic modal logics by monadic ones is still open. It is our intention to provide a positive answer to this question.
What are polyadic modal operators? Syntactically, an n-ary modal operator is just an n-ary connective; what makes it modal is its intended interpretation, which uses accessibility relations of arity n+1. Generalizing the definition of ordinary modal logic, the truth condition for an n-ary operator ∇ reads as follows:
M, w ∇(ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ) iff there are v 1 , . . . , v n such that R ∇ wv 1 . . . v n and M, v j ϕ i for each j.
Here R ∇ denotes the n + 1-are relation associated with ∇. Alternatively, one could give a syntactic specification by defining the notion of a normal, polyadic modal logic, cf. section 2, or start from an algebraic perspective by considering n-ary operators on Boolean algebras, cf. Jónsson & Tarski [8] . Examples of such (binary) operators can be found in categorial grammar (see Lambek [13] , Roorda [15] ), in temporal logic of intervals (see Venema [18] , Hansen & Zhou [6] ) or in multidimensional modal logics such as arrow logic (see Marx et alii [14] ). A prime example in the theory of Boolean algebras with operators is the composition operator in relation algebras, see Hodkinson and Hirsch [7] . It should be noted here that interpretations of this specific operator using unary ones (cylindric and substitution operators, to be precise) have been known in algebraic logic for a long time.
If we are after a simulation of arbitrary polyadic modal logics by monomodal ones, by the results of Kracht and Wolter it suffices to find out how to simulate a polyadic modal logic by a polymodal one. And since simulation results are usually based on semantic intuitions, the starting point would be to encode an n + 1-ary relation (n ≥ 2) using a number of binary relations. There are of course various ways to do so; our approach, which is independent and different from the one in [10] , and also differs from the approach followed in Kurtonina [12] , is described in detail in section 3. We confine ourselves to a polyadic language L ∇ with one single dyadic operator ∇; our basic idea is to decompose the ternary accessibility relation T into four binary relations that we will call S, R 0 , R 1 and R 2 ; accordingly, the polymodal language L 3 in which we interpret L ∇ will have four diamonds Q s , Q 0 , Q 1 and Q 2 . The semantic idea of simulating L ∇ -structures by L 3 -ones has a syntactic counterpart in an interpretation function (·) 3 mapping L ∇ -formulas to L 3 -formulas. Finally, using the completeness of normal modal logics with respect to descriptive general frames, we are able to define a function (·) sim mapping normal L ∇ -logics to L 3 -logics.
The main results of our paper are stated in the Theorems 5.3 and 5.4; the first theorem states that the function (·) sim is indeed a simulation, while the second result lists a number of important properties of modal logics that are transferred by this simulation -a concise survey is provided in Table 1 .
Finally, the only reason why we confine ourselves to a polyadic modal language with a single modality of arity 2 is to keep our notation as simple as possible. It is entirely obvious how to extend our results to modalities of arity bigger than two. Our approach does not cover the case of a nullary modality or modal constant; however, the unary relation U c that is the semantic counterpart of such a constant c, can easily be encoded as the binary relation Id Uc = {(s, s) | s ∈ U c }. Following this lead one easily shows how to simulate modal logics in such a language by a normal modal logic in a diamond language. Since it is also obvious that one can generalize our result to languages with a (possibly infinite) number of modalities of various rank, this shows that normal polymodal logics can adequately simulate normal modal logics in arbitrary modal languages. Combining this with the results of Kracht and Wolter, it follows that (provided we confine ourselves to finite languages), normal monomodal logics can indeed simulate all others.
It also follows that using our simulation, we can extend any interpretation of monomodal logic to polyadic modal logics. As an example we mention the 'box-as-power set' interpretation which maps the notion of derivability from a monomodal logic into the first-order notion of derivability from the set theory Ω; we refer to van Benthem et alii [1, 2] for more details.
Overview The next section provides some background information on the theory of modal logics with operators of arbitrary rank, and on the notion of one logic simulating another; we also mention some specific definitions and notational conventions. In section 3 and 4 we explain the basic semantic ideas underlying our approach, defining simulation and unsimulation maps that turn L ∇ -structures into L ∇ -structures, and vice versa. Section 5 forms the pivot of the paper, containing the definition of the simulation operation (·) sim which maps L ∇ -logics to L 3 -logics, and the two main theorems of the paper; this section also has the proofs of the easy parts of these theorems, while the remaining sections are devoted to proofs of the harder parts.
Preliminaries
Since not every reader may be familiar with polyadic modal operators, in this preliminary section we briefly recall some basic notions concerning modal languages and logics with poyadic operators; for more detailed information, the reader is referred to [3] . We also fix some notational conventions concerning the particular languages that we will be dealing with in this paper.
Modal Languages A modal similarity type τ is a pair τ = O, ρ , where O is a nonempty set, whose elements are called modal operators, and ρ : O → N is an arity function. With a modal similarity type τ and a set of propositional variables P we associate a modal language L τ (P ) whose symbols range over P ∪ O ∪ { , ∧, ¬} ∪ {(, )}. Often, we will not be specific concerning the set of propositional variables and write L τ instead of L τ (P ). We will identify the modal language with its set of formulas which we define inductively as the smallest superset of P ∪ { } which contains ¬ϕ and ϕ ∧ ψ if ϕ and ψ are formulas, and contains ∇(ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ) if ∇ is an n-adic modal operator and ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n are formulas.
Besides the standard abbreviations for the Boolean connectives, we use the symbol ∆ for the dual operator to ∇; that is, ∆(ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ) abbreviates ¬∇(¬ϕ 1 , . . . , ¬ϕ n ). We will use diamonds, i.e., symbols of the form Q j , for monadic modal operators; their duals are boxes:
Modal Semantics Given a modal language L τ , a Kripke frame over L τ , or briefly: an L τ -frame, is a tuple F = (W, R ∇ ) ∇∈τ , where W is a nonempty set, and every R ∇ is a relation on W of arity ρ(∇) + 1. A model is a pair M = (F, V ), where F is a frame and V is a valuation; that is, a function assigning to each propositional variable p ∈ P a subset V (p) of W . The notion of truth of a formula ϕ in M at a world w is defined in a standard way, the clause for an n-adic modal operator ∇ being
The definitions of other semantic notions are also as usual. We would like to stress however that in this paper we only consider the local consequence relation. For instance, if C is a class of L τ -frames, Σ is a set of L τ -formulas, and ϕ is a L τ -formula, then we say that ϕ is a consequence of Σ over C if for every model M that is based on a frame in C, and every point w in M, we have that M, w Σ only if M, w ϕ.
Given an n+1-ary relation R on a set W , we define the operation m R : (P(W )) n → P(W ) by m R (a 1 , . . . , a n ) = {w ∈ W | Rwv 1 . . . v n for some v 1 ∈ a 1 ,. . . , v n ∈ a n }.
where F is an L τ -frame and A is a collection of subsets of W which is closed under the Boolean operations and under the operations m R ∇ for each modal operator ∇. The definition of notions such as admissible sets and validity on a general frame is as usual in modal logic. A general L τ -frame G = (F, A) is called differentiated if for all distinct points there is an admissible set a containing precisely one of the two points; tight if for every modality ∇ and for all points w 1 , . . . , w n ∈ W for which R ∇ ww 1 . . . w n does not hold, there are admissible sets a 1 , . . . , a n satsifying w i ∈ a i for all i but not w ∈ m R ∇ (a 1 , . . . , a n ); compact if every subset A 0 of A with the finite intersection property has a non-empty intersection. A general frame is called refined if it is differentiated and tight, and descriptive if it is refined and compact. D Σ denotes the class of descriptive general frames in which Σ is valid.
Normal Modal Logics
The minimal normal modal logic K τ of similarity type τ is the minimal set of formulas of the language L τ which is closed under the rules of Modus Ponens, Uniform Substitution, and Necessitation: from ϕ, infer ∆(⊥, . . . , ϕ, . . . , ⊥), while containing all propositional tautologies and the axioms
The latter axiom is needed since we have taken the existential ∇ as our primitive operator.)
A normal modal L τ -logic Λ is a set of formulae which contains K τ and is closed under Modus Ponens, Uniform Substitution and Necessitation. If Γ is a set of formulae, we define K τ .Γ as the minimal normal modal logic containing Γ.
Given a normal logic Λ we say that a formula ϕ is a theorem of Λ, and we write Λ ϕ, if ϕ belongs to Λ. In accordance with our use of the local paradigm in the semantics, we say that a formula ϕ is derivable from a set of formulas Σ in a normal modal logic Λ, notation:
For properties of normal modal logics such as elementarity, completeness or canonicity, the usual definitions apply.
Simulations
The following definitions are taken from Kracht & Wolter's [11] , but restricted to our context. Given two modal languages L τ and L τ , an interpretation of L τ in L τ is a map (·) F : L τ → L τ which satisfies the following uniformity conditions (for all proposition letters, L τ -formulas and τ -operators involved):
Given two normal modal logics Λ and Λ in L τ and L τ , respectively, we say Λ simulates Λ with respect to (·) F , if for all Σ ⊆ L τ and ϕ ∈ L τ :
A simulation is a function mapping normal modal logics in one language to simulating logics in another. For a property P of normal modal logics, we say that a simulation (·) s preserves P if it holds that if Λ has P , then Λ s has P . Similarly we say that (·) s reflects P if Λ has P whenever Λ s does. Finally, (·) s transfers P if it both preserves and reflects P .
Specific definitions and notational conventions
In this paper we propose a scheme of interpretations to map modal languages with polyadic operators to modal languages with diamonds only, and for each interpretation we define an associated simulation. For notational convenience, we will be dealing exclusively with two modal languages, L ∇ and L 3 , respectively. L ∇ has a single binary operator ∇, while L 3 has four diamonds: Q s , Q 0 , Q 1 and Q 2 ; throughout this paper we reserve the symbol i to refer to an element of the set {0, 1, 2}. In the semantics of L ∇ , we will denote the ternary accessibility relation for ∇ by T , and in the semantics of L 3 , we will denote the relations for Q s , Q 0 , Q 1 and Q 2 with S, R 0 , R 1 and R 2 , respectively. Given an L 3 -frame F = (W, S, R 0 , R 1 , R 2 ) we will denote the associated operations m S , m R 0 , m R 1 , m R 2 as m s , m 0 , m 1 and m 2 , respectively. Throughout this paper we use the following notational convention: whenever we define a map (·) q : A → B, then for any subset X of A we let X q denote the set {x q | x ∈ X}. The same convention applies, mutatis mutandis, to lifting operations on structures to operations on classes of structures.
3 Simulating L ∇ -structures
The basic idea
The basic idea behind our simulation is the following. In the Kripke semantics of L ∇ , we interpret the modal operator ∇ using a ternary accessibility relation T . If we want to simulate ∇ using diamonds, we have to encode the ternary relation using binary ones. There are a number of ways to do this; of these options we have chosen the following.
where W • , S, R 0 , R 1 and R 2 are defined as follows:
wSt iff t ∈ T and t 0 = w, tR i w iff t ∈ T and t i = w.
Here and in the sequel we use the following notation: whenever t is a triple of elements of W , we let t i denote the i-th coordinate of t; that is, we can write t = (t 0 , t 1 , t 2 ). When we are discussing such a simulation frame F • , the elements of W will be called old or base points, the elements of T , new or middle points. ¡
In words, to obtain F • from F, we add each triple (u, v, w) of points from W to the universe, provided that the relation T holds of u, v and w. The relation S holds of two points w and t if w is an old point, t is a triple in T and w = t 0 ; and for each i, the relation R i holds of two points t and w provided that w is an old point, t is a triple in T and w is the i-th coordinate of t. Thus each T -triple (u, v, w) is added as a witness to the fact that (u, v, w) indeed belongs to T , with the new relations holding as indicated in Figure 1 . [htb] This picture also explains our use of the terms 'base' and 'middle' points. Throughout this paper we will make use of the fact that in any simulation frame we can distinguish the • , V, w m iff w is a middle point,
The basic translation function mapping L ∇ -formulas to L 3 -formulas is closely related to the semantic intuition of simulating a frame.
Definition 3.2
The translation function (·) t : L ∇ → L 3 is defined by the following formula induction:
The map (·) 3 : L ∇ → L 3 is defined as follows:
The map (·) 3 is not an interpretation in the strict sense of the word -the reader can easily check that, for instance, (¬q∇¬q)
Nevertheless, we will pretend that it is an interpretation and also call it an interpretation.
Our justification for this improper use of terminology is the following. Consider the translation (·) + : L ∇ → L 3 defined as follows:
Clearly, (·) + is an interpretation in the strict sense of the word. The point is that we could have been working with (·) + instead of with (·) 3 , and obtain the very same results. In fact, the map (·) 3 can be seen as a simplified version of (·) + ; the difference, which lies in the fact that in (·) 3 we do not restrict to base points in every clause of the inductive definition, makes that (·) 3 is much easier to work with in practice.
The following proposition shows that the translation map (·) t is truth preserving.
Proposition 3.4 Let F be an L ∇ -frame, and let V and V be valuations on F and F • , respectively, such that V and V agree on the base points of F • . Then for all states w of F, and for all L ∇ -formulas ϕ we have
Proof. This proposition can be proved by a straightforward induction on the complexity of ϕ. For the atomic case, we have that
For the inductive step, the case of the Boolean connectives is trivial. Assume then that ϕ is of the form ϕ 1 ∇ϕ 2 . First we suppose that F, V, w ϕ. This implies the existence of points u 1 , u 2 in W such that T wu 1 u 2 , and F, V, u i ϕ i . From the inductive hypothesis we may infer that F • , V , u i ϕ i . It follows from T wu 1 u 2 that the triple t = (w, u 1 , u 2 ) is a middle point in F • ; it is obvious that wSt, tR i u i . But then we easily find that
, which is what we were after.
For the other direction, suppose that F • , V , w ϕ t . It is easy to see that this implies the existence of points t, u 1 and u 2 in F • such that wSt, tR i u i and F • , V , u i ϕ i . Using the definition of F • we find that t is a middle point, that u 1 and u 2 are base points, that in fact, t is the triple (w, u 1 , u 2 ), and that since t belongs to T we have T wu 1 u 2 . The inductive hypothesis gives that F, V, u i ϕ i . Hence we may conclude that indeed F, V, w ϕ 1 ∇ϕ 2 . qed
As an immediate corollary we obtain that the map (·) 3 transfers validity between a frame and its simulation. Proposition 3.5 Let F be an L ∇ -frame, and ϕ an L ∇ -formula. Then
Proof. We only prove the direction from left to right. Suppose that F ϕ but, for contradiction, that F • ϕ 3 . That is, for some valuation V on F • and some point w in F • we have that F • , V , w b → ϕ t . It follows that F • , V , w b whence w must be a base point. Now define the valuation V on F as follows:
where W is the collection of old points (that is, the universe of F). Obviously, we may now use Proposition 3.4 to infer from F • , V , w ϕ t that F, V, w ϕ. This shows that F ϕ. qed
Simulating general frames
It is well-known that Kripke frames do not form a mathematically adequate semantics for modal logics; hence, if we want to simulate arbitrary modal ∇-logics, including the ones that are not complete, it would be good to extend our simulation to the kind of structures that do provide a good semantics for modal logics, such as modal algebras or general frames. In this paper we concentrate on general frames.
it is the general L 3 -frame based on F • which is generated by A.
Proof. In order to prove that G • is a general frame, it suffices to show that the collection A • contains ∅ and W ∪ T , and that it is closed under the boolean and modal operations. We only prove the part concerning closure under the modal operations.
. We have to show that m s d and m i d for i = 0, 1, 2 belong to A • . For m i this follows from
In each case we obtain a subset of W • which clearly belongs to A • . For closure under m s , we need the fact that m s (T ∩ a 0 × a 1 × a 2 ) = {w ∈ W | there is a t in T ∩ a 0 × a 1 × a 2 with wSt} = {w ∈ W | there are t i in W with w = t 0 , t i ∈ a i and T t 0 t 1 t 2 }, = {t 0 ∈ a 0 | there are t 1 ∈ a 1 , t 2 ∈ a 2 with T t 0 t 1 t 2 },
For, this shows that
Finally, we leave it for the reader to verify that A • is the smallest set containing A which is closed under the boolean and modal operations. qed
The following proposition will play an important role when we prove our basic simulation result.
Proof. First we prove the direction from left to right. Assume that G is a general L ∇ -frame such that G ϕ. Now let V be an arbitrary admissible valuation on G • ; define the valuation V on G as in the proof of Proposition 3.5; that is, put
with J finite and a and each a j , b j and c j in A, then we find that V (p) = a belongs to A. From the admissibility of V we may infer that G, V ϕ; hence, using Proposition 3.4 we find that G • , V b → ϕ t ; since V was arbitrary this gives that G • ϕ 3 . The other direction is even simpler: assume that G • ϕ 3 , and consider an arbitrary admissible valuation V on G. It is immediate by the definition of G • that V is admissible on G • as well. From this it is straightforward to prove the proposition. qed
Transfer of properties
In the sequel we will be working with descriptive general frames mainly. Hence, it is good to know that the simulation operation behaves well with respect to this property of general frames.
Proposition 3.9 Let G be a general L ∇ -frame. Then G is descriptive if and only if G • is descriptive.
Proof. The right to left direction of this proposition follows from more general results that we will prove later, cf. the Propositions 4.16 and 4.18 below. In order to show that the simulation operation preserves descriptiveness, fix a general frame G = (W, T, A). We first prove two claims that concern the differentiation and tightness
Assume that G is differentiated and let u and v be two distinct points in W • . We have to find an admissible set a ∈ A • such that one of the points belongs to a and the other one does not. This is easy if one of the points, say u, belongs to W , while the other belongs to T , since
If both u and v belong to W then by assumption there is an a ∈ A such that u ∈ a and v ∈ a; this suffices because A ⊆ A • . This leaves the case that both u and v belong to T . It follows from u = v that u i = v i for some i ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Since G is differentiated there is an a ∈ A such that u i ∈ a and v i ∈ a. Clearly then u ∈ m i a ∈ A • while v ∈ m i a. This proves (1) .
Assume that G is differentiated. We first prove tightness of G • with respect to the R i relations. Let u and v be points in W • such that for all a ∈ A • we have that v ∈ a implies u ∈ m i a. Then it follows from v ∈ W • that u ∈ T = m i W • , and from m i T = ∅ that v ∈ T . Hence, v is a base point and u is a middle point of W • . Suppose, for contradiction, that R i uv does not hold; by definition this means that v = u i , so differentiation of G gives a set a ∈ A such that v ∈ a, u i ∈ a. But then we have v ∈ a and u ∈ m i a which gives the desired contradiction.
Turning to the tightness of G • with respect to the relation S, we consider two points u and v such that for all a ∈ A • we have that v ∈ a implies u ∈ m s a. It is fairly easy to see that u must be a base point, and v, a middle point. We claim that u = v 0 , from which it is immediate that Suv. In order to prove that u = v 0 , by the assumed differentation of G it suffices to show that for every a ∈ A we have that v 0 ∈ a implies u ∈ a. So let a be admissible in G and assume that v 0 belongs to a; then the triple v belongs to a × W × W , so by assumption we have that
we obtain the desired membership of u in a. This proves (2) . Now assume that G is descriptive. It follows from (1) and (2) that G • is refined, so we only have to show that G • is compact. Let C ⊆ A • be a collection of admissible sets with the finite intersection property. We have to show that C = ∅.
Define C b = {c ∩ W | c ∈ C} and C m = {c ∩ T | c ∈ C}; obviously, at least one of these two sets has the finite intersection property. If this is the set C b , then we may infer that C b = ∅ from C b ⊆ A and the compactness of G. So, assume that C m has the finite intersection property. Let τ be the topology on W that we obtain by taking A as a basis. It is well known that τ is a Stone space; hence, the product topology (W 3 , τ 3 ) is a compact Hausdorff space. It follows from the tightness of G that T is a closed subset of W 3 with respect to this topology (in order to see this, show that its complement
. But then the restriction of τ 3 to T is compact; from this it is immediate that C m = ∅. This proves the compactness, and hence, the descriptiveness, of G. qed
It may have attracted the attention of the reader that in our proof of Proposition 3.9 we did not show that the constituting properties of descriptiveness (differentiation, tightness and compactness) are preserved one by one. For instance, when proving that G • is compact, we needed G to be differentiated and tight as well. In fact, we have a number of counterexamples showing that not all properties of general frames are transferred by the operation (·) • .
Remark 3.10 It can be the case that G is tight, while G • is not. For instance, suppose that G is given as the structure (W, T, A) with W = {x, y, y , z},
We leave it for the reader to verify that G is tight. In order to describe the general simulation frame G • , let w denote the triple (x, y, z) and w the triple (x, y , z). Then we have that G • is of the form (W • , S, R 0 , R 1 , R 2 , B) with W • = {x, y, y , z, w, w }, the binary relations as always, and B is given as the set of subsets of W • satisfying both y ∈ b iff y ∈ b and w ∈ b iff w ∈ b. It is then easy to see that for all b ∈ B we have that y ∈ b implies w ∈ m 1 b, while it certainly does not hold that w R 1 y. This shows that G • is not tight.
Conversely, since we only needed differentiation of G in order to prove tightness of G • , there are many non-tight general frames with a tight simulation. For instance, consider the structure H = (W , T , A ) with
A = {a ⊆ W |a is finite and ω ∈ a, or a is co-finite and ω ∈ a}.
H is not tight, since we have ω ∈ m T (a, b) whenever ω ∈ a and ω ∈ b, while T ωωω does not hold. But H is clearly differentiated, whence H • is tight by (2) .
H is also a counterexample to the conjecture that the operation (·) • preserves compactness. For, it is not difficult to see that H is compact; now consider the collection B ⊆ A • of admissible sets of the form T ∩ (a 0 × a 1 × a 3 ) such that each a i is co-finite. It is not difficult to show that B has the finite intersection property; in order to show that the intersection of finitely many elements of B is not empty one just has to look for a large enough natural number. However, the set B is empty; for, (ω, ω, ω) is the only triple (t 0 , t 1 , t 2 ) such that each t i belongs to all co-finite sets. The problem is that (ω, ω, ω) does not belong to T . This problem would not have occurred if H had been tight, as the last part of the proof of Proposition 3.9 shows.
Unsimulating L Q -structures
For various reasons it is not sufficient to have a structural operation that moves in one direction only, taking L ∇ -structures into L 3 -structures. We also need an 'unsimulation' operation that maps L 3 -structures to L ∇ -ones.
Axiomatizing simulation frames
One of the main applications of this unsimulation map is to help find a characterization of the simulation frames, i.e., the L 3 -frames that are the simulation of some L ∇ -frame. Definition 4.1 Consider the following set of first order axioms:
The formula S2 is defined as the conjunction ij S2 ij , and similar definitions apply to S1 and S3. Let Sim denote the set {S0, . . . , S3}, and Sim + the set {S0, . . . , S4}. An L 3 -frame satisfying Sim is called a Sim-frame. ¡
In words, these axioms express the following. S0 states that the relations S and R 0 are each other's converse; S1, that each relation R i is a partial function; S2, that if a state belongs to the domain of one of these three partial functions, then it belongs to the domain of each of them. According to S3, if a point y belongs to the range of some of these partial functions, then it cannot belong to the domain of any of them. Finally, given the other axioms, S4 expresses the fact that points that belong to the domain of each R i are completely determined by the triple consisting of their R 0 , R 1 and R 2 -successors.
It is not very difficult to prove that Sim + completely characterizes (up to isomorphism) the class of simulation frames, cf. Proposition 4.4 below. But if the Sim + -frames form the class of simulation frames (modulo isomorphism) and, obviously, not all Sim-frames are Sim + -frames, why are we interested in the Sim-frames? The reason is that although we have a first order characterization of the class of simulation frames, we cannot characterize it in terms of modal formulas -this follows from Proposition 4.10 below, together with the fact that the classes of Sim-frame and Sim + -frames are distinct. The class of Sim-frames happens to be a good approximation for the class of simulation frames, and it does allow a modal characterization. In fact, Proposition 4.10 states that the Sim-frames form the class of bounded morphic images of simulation frames. This explains the important role of this class in our work.
As we mentioned already, in order to prove the first order characterization result concerning the simulation frames, we will use the definition of the unsimulation of a simulation frame. However, we need to define this notion for arbitrary Sim-frames. Definition 4.2 Let F = (W, S, R 0 , R 1 , R 2 ) be a Sim-frame. A point w of F is called a middle point if it has an R 0 -successor (or, equivalently, an R 1 or an R 2 -successor) and a base point if it has no R 0 -successor. The collection of base points is denoted as W • , the collection of middle points by W m .
It follows from the axioms S1 and S4 that for each i we may assume the existence of a map r i : W m → W mapping middle points to their unique R i -successors.
Given a Sim-frame, we define its unsimulation as the L ∇ -frame
, where T uvw holds of three base points if there is a point m such that R 0 mu, R 1 mv and R 2 mw. ¡
In the following proposition we gather some useful information about Sim-frames. In the sequel, these facts will be used without warning.
1. Each R i -successor (of any point) is a base point; that is, the range of each map r i is included in W • .
2. Each S-successor (of any point) is a middle point.
3. No point can have both S-successors and R i successors for some i.
Proof. Left to the reader. qed
We leave the proof of Proposition 4.3 to the reader and turn to the first order characterization of the simulation frames.
Proposition 4.4 Let F be an L 3 -frame. Then F |= Sim + if and only if F is isomorphic to a simulation frame.
Proof. It is easy to check that each of the Sim + -axioms holds of every simulation frame, so we do not go into detail here. For the other direction of the proof, consider an L 3 -frame
Clearly, for any middle point m of F the triple (r 0 m, r 1 m, r 2 m) belongs to the relation T of F • . This means that the following map f :
It is fairly easy to see that f is a bijection: surjectivity is immediate by the definition of T , while injectivity follows from axiom S4.
The map is a homomorphism. To see this, first suppose that R i mw. Then m is a middle point and w is a base point. Since w is the unique successor of m, we have that w = r i m. This shows that in (F • ) • we have R i f (m)f (w), as required. But if f is a homomorphism with respect to each R i then also with respect to S, since in both F and (F • ) • , R 0 and S are each other's converse.
Finally, we show that f −1 is a homomorphism as well. Suppose that
there must be a middle point m such that R 0 m t 0 , R 1 m t 1 and R 2 m t 2 ; this shows that f (m ) = t = f (m), so by injectivity of f we find that m and m are identical. Also, from f (w) = t i we easily infer that w is a base point and that in fact, w = t i . We already saw that R i m t i ; now we know that this really boils down to R i mw. Hence, f −1 is a homomorphism with respect to the R i relations; but just like for f we then easily infer f −1 to be a homomorphism with respect to S as well.
This shows that f is an isomorphism between F and (F • ) • and thus finishes the proof. qed Remark 4.5 It is possible to extend the simulation and unsimulation operations to adjoint functors between the categories of L ∇ -frames and Sim-frames (both with bounded morphisms as arrows). Using these functors one can show that the category of L ∇ -frames is equivalent to the category of (isomorphic copies of) simulation frames. Since we will not need these results further on, we do not provide the details here.
We do need the fact that the unsimulation operation behaves well with respect to the translation maps we defined in the previous section. Proposition 4.6 Let F be a Sim-frame, and let V and V be valuations on F and F • , respectively, such that V and V agree on W • . Then for all L ∇ -formulas ϕ and all base points w we have
Proof. This proposition is proved by a straightforward induction on the complexity of L ∇ -formulas. We only treat, of the inductive step, the case that ϕ is of the form ψ 1 ∇ψ 2 . The claim follows by the following chain of equivalences:
there are m, w 1 , w 2 with R 0 mw, R i mw i and
As an immediate corollary we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4.7 Let F be a Sim-frame. Then for all L ∇ -formulas ϕ we have
To finish off this subsection, we discuss the precise relation between the Sim-frames and the simulation frames. We will show in Proposition 4.10 below that the Sim-frames form the class of bounded morphic images of the simulation frames. In our proof of this result we will use the construction of unravelling a frame and a model. Since we will use this construction later as well, we isolate the following definition and proposition.
be an L 3 -frame, and let r be some point in F. We define the unravelling of F from r, notation: F r , to be the frame (W , S , R 0 R 1 , R 2 ) given as follows. W is the set of all sequences w 0 . . . w n (n ≥ 0) of elements in W such that w 0 = r and for all i < n: either w i Sw i+1 or w i R 1 w i+1 or w i R 2 w i+1 . Let last(w) denote the last item of the sequencew, and letws denote the result of adding s as a new last item to the sequencē w. The relations of F are defined as follows:
wS v ifv =ws and last(w)Ss for some point s, wR 0v ifvS w, wR 1v ifv =ws and last(w)R 1 s for some point s, wR 2v ifv =ws and last(w)R 2 s for some point s.
For an L 3 -model M = (F, V ), its unravelling from r is defined as the model M r = ( F r , V ) where V is the valuation given by
be a model and let r be some point in F. Then 1. the map last : W r → W constitutes a bounded morphism from F r to F.
2. the map last : W r → W constitutes a bounded morphism from M r to M mapping (the sequence) r to r.
3. if F is a Sim-frame, and r is a base point, then F r is isomorphic to a simulation frame.
Proof. The first two claims of the proposition are standard. For the third part, it follows immediately from the definitions that unravellings of Simframes validate the axiom S4. It is also fairly straightforward to check that if F is a Sim-frame, then so is F r -we leave the details to the reader. qed
This relation between the simulation frames and their modal approximations, the Simframes, can be concisely formulated as follows.
Proposition 4.10
The Sim-frames form the class of bounded morphic images of the simulation frames.
Proof of Proposition 4.10. First suppose that F = (W, S, R 0 , R 1 , R 2 ) is a Sim-frame. It is easy to prove from Proposition 4.9 that F is a bounded morphic image of the disjoint union of the collection { F r | r ∈ W • } of its unravellings from base points. Since each of these unravellings is isomorphic to a simulation frame, say F r ∼ = E • r , and an easy proof reveals that
• , this shows that F is a bounded morphic image of the simulation frame ( r∈W• E r )
• .
For the other direction of the proposition, it suffices to prove that the class of Sim-frames is closed under taking bounded morphic images. This can be proved directly, but it also follows from the fact that this class allows a modal characterization (cf. Proposition 4.12) and the fact that modally definable classes are closed under taking bounded morphic images. qed
A modal axiomatization
It is fairly easy to give a modal axiomatization of the class of Sim-frames.
Definition 4.11
Consider the following set of modal axioms:
Ax be the set {A0, A1, A2, A3} (with similar definitions of A1, A2 and A3 as in Definition 4.1). We define Sim to be the basic modal logic K 3 extended with the axiom set Ax . ¡ Proposition 4.12 Each of the axioms Ak ij is a Sahlqvist formula; its first order correspondent is the formula Sk ij . As a corollary, the set Ax modally characterizes the class of Sim-frames, and the logic Sim is canonical and strongly sound and complete with respect to the class of Sim-frames.
Proof. Immediate by the syntactic shape of the modal axioms, and the properties of Sahlqvist formulas. qed
From this result and the earlier established close connection between Sim-frames and simulation frames, the following proposition is almost immediate. Proposition 4.13 Sim is strongly sound and complete with repect to the class of simulation frames.
Proof. Soundness is a consequence of Proposition 4.12. For completeness, suppose that Σ is a set of L 3 -formulas and ϕ is an L 3 -formula such that Σ Sim ϕ. It follows from Proposition 4.12 that there is a model M = (F, V ) based on a Sim-frame F, and a point r in M such that M, r Σ while M, r ϕ. It easily follows from the results in Proposition 4.9 and the invariance of modal truth under bounded morphisms (on the level of models) that M r , r Σ while M r , r ϕ. Since F r is isomorphic to a simulation frame, this shows that ϕ is not a consequence of Σ on the class of simulation frames. qed
Unsimulating general frames
Now we extend the unsimulation to the level of general frames.
Definition 4.14 A general Sim-frame is a general frame based on a Sim-frame. Given such a general Sim-frame G = (F, A), its unsimulation G • is defined as the structure (
Proof. Let G = (F, A) be a general Sim-frame. We have to show that A • contains the sets W • and ∅ and that it is closed under the Boolean operations and under the operation m T . We only treat the case of m T . Suppose that a 1 and a 2 belong to A • ; it suffices to prove that m T (a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ T . It is straightforward to show that in a Sim-frame we have that
From this it follows that m T (a 1 , a 2 ) belongs to A; but since in a Sim-frame it also holds that m s a ⊆ W • for any a ⊆ W , we find that
That the name unsimulation is well chosen follows from the following proposition. 
Proof. Let F be the underlying frame of G. First suppose that G ϕ 3 . That is, for some admissible valuation V and some point w in G we have F, V, w b → ϕ t . It follows immediately that w must be a base point. Define the valuation V on F by putting V (p) = V (p) ∩ W • . Clearly, V is admissible on G • , and since V and V meet the conditions of Proposition 4.6, we find that F • , V , w ϕ. This shows that
For the other direction, suppose that G • ϕ. Then there is an admissible valuation V on G • and a point w in F • such that F • , V , w ϕ. Since the valuation V is admissible on G as well, and since w, being a point of W • , is a base point of F, we may apply Proposition 4.6 which immediately gives F, V, w ¬ϕ t . Using the fact that F, V, w b we find that G ϕ 3 . qed
Transfer of properties of general frames
Proof. It is straightforward to show that the unsimulation operations preserves differentiation and compactness, so we concentrate on tightness. Let G = (W, S, R 0 , R 1 , R 2 , A) be a descriptive general Sim-frame. In order to prove that G • is tight, let u 0 , u 1 and u 2 be points in W • such that for all a 1 and a 2 in A • we have that u 1 ∈ a 1 and u 2 ∈ a 2 imply that u 0 ∈ m T (a 1 , a 2 ). We will prove that T u 0 u 1 u 2 .
Consider the set
Our first claim is that D has the finite intersection property. Since for each i the set {m i a | u i ∈ a} is closed under taking intersections, it suffices to show that for each triple a 0 , a 1 , a 2 in A • such that u 0 ∈ a 0 , u 1 ∈ a 1 and u 2 ∈ a 2 we have that m 0 a 0 ∩ m 1 a 1 ∩ m 2 a 2 = ∅. Take such a triple; it follows from u 1 ∈ a 1 and
Hence, there is a point t in W such that R 0 tu 0 and t ∈ m 1 a 1 ∩ m 2 a 2 . From Rtu 0 if follows that Su 0 t, since G is based on a Sim-frame; hence, from u 0 ∈ a 0 we may infer that t ∈ m 0 a 0 . This shows that t ∈ m 0 a 0 ∩ m 1 a 1 ∩ m 2 a 2 , so indeed, the latter set is not empty. But then by compactness, we have that D = ∅. Let t be an arbitrary point in the intersection; obviously, t is a middle point of G. Fix an i ∈ {0, 1, 2}; it follows from t ∈ {m i a | u i ∈ A • } and the fact that m i a = m i (a ∩ W • ) for each a ∈ A, that t ∈ m i a for each a ∈ A such that u i ∈ a. Then from tightness of G we may infer that R i tu. Since this applies to each i, we find that t is a middle point of u 0 , u 1 and u 2 ; by definition of T we thus get that T u 0 u 1 u 2 . qed
In the above proof, we used compactness of G in order to prove that G • is tight; this is necessary, as is witnessed by the general L ∇ -frame H of Remark 3.10. For, the general L 3 -frame H • is tight (but not compact), while its unsimulation H = (H • ) • is not tight.
Finally, there are not many properties of general frames that are reflected by the unsimulation operation. For instance, it is fairly easy to see that differentiation and compactness are not reflected, by considering general frames that are based on a Sim-frame with three base points and infinitely many middle points. Tightness is not reflected either, since it is not even preserved by the simulation operation (cf. the general frame G of Remark 3.10).
Simulation results
In this pivotal section we define the simulation operation (·) sim which maps L ∇ -logics to L 3 -logics, we prove that Λ sim indeed simulates Λ and we state that several interesting properties of logics transfer under (·) sim . In this section we will also provide some of the easier transfer proofs; the more elaborate ones will be given in later sections.
In order to motivate our definition of the simulation operation, consider an L ∇ -logic Λ. Since Λ is determined by the class D Λ of descriptive general L ∇ -frames for Λ, it seems natural to define Λ sim as the modal theory of a class K of descriptive general L 3 -frames that is related to D Λ . A first choice would be to take the class (D Λ ) • of simulations of frames in D Λ . Unfortunately, although the theory of this class would constitute a simulation of Λ, it turned out to be difficult to prove nice transfer results using this approach. Therefore, we have chosen a slightly more involved definition.
Definition 5.1 Let C be a class of L ∇ -frames ; we define C to be class of Sim-frames F such that F • belongs to C. For a class C of descriptive general L ∇ -frames, we define C to be the class of descriptive general Sim-frames G such that G • belongs to C. Now let Λ be an L ∇ -logic. Recall that D Λ denotes the class of descriptive general L ∇ -frames for Λ. We define Λ sim , the simulation of Λ, to be the set of formulas valid on (D Λ ) . ¡ Remark 5.2 Note that the definition of Λ sim is based on our semantic ideas. A perhaps more intuitive syntactic approach would be to define Λ sim as the extension of Sim axiomatized by the set Λ 3 of translations of Λ-theorems. Getting ahead of later results, in particular of Proposition 5.5, we want to inform the reader already now that these two definitions are in fact equivalent.
The following theorem reveals that our terminology is appropriate. Theorem 5.3 (Simulation Theorem) Let Λ be an L ∇ -logic; then Λ sim is indeed a simulation of Λ. That is, for any set Σ of L ∇ -formulas, and any L ∇ -formula ϕ we have
In particular, we have that
Proof. We first prove (3). For the left to right implication of (3), assume that ϕ 3 does not belong to Λ sim . Then by definition of Λ sim , there is a Sim-based descriptive general L 3 -frame such that G
In order to derive the theorem from this, only propositional logic is required. For instance, suppose that Σ Λ ϕ. By definition there are formulas σ 1 , . . . , σ n in Σ such that
, which by definition means that Σ 3 Λ sim ϕ 3 . We leave the other direction as an exercise to the reader. qed
Obviously, a simulation operation becomes more interesting the more properties it preserves and reflects. Our earlier claim that the operation (·) sim behaves rather well is substantiated by the following result. Proof. Here we only prove the first part of the theorem -the statements in Table 1 concerning the preservation and reflection of properties are proved in the remainder of the paper, as indicated by the entries in the 
2 , we will use the well-known fact that
Likewise, we have that Λ sim
). But this gives that
The statement then follows from the observation that for any class C of descriptive general L ∇ -frames it holds that (Th ∇ (C)) sim = Th 3 (C ), cf. Proposition 7.9. qed
Before we move to the proofs of the easier results mentioned in Table 1 , we briefly discuss some properties that are conspicuous by their absence, and some further open questions concerning our simulation approach.
1. We have not investigated the question whether the simulation reflects Sahlqvist axiomatizability; we conjecture that the answer to this question is positive, but the only proof that we can think of would involve a very tedious investigation of the properties of the residual map discussed in section 8. The question seems to be not very relevant since we can show that the most useful properties of Sahlqvist logics (canonicity, completeness and first-order definability) are reflected by the simulation operation anyway.
2. As we already mentioned in the preliminaries, we confine ourselves in this paper to the local paradigm concerning the semantic consequence relation and our notion of deduction. We have not investigated the transfer of properties such as global completeness.
3. Although it easily follows from our Simulation Theorem and the simplicity of our translation that decidability is reflected by our simulation, we do not know whether this property is preserved in all cases. An attempt to settle this problem in the positive might proceed through a careful combinatorial analysis of the residual formulas discussed in section 8.
More can be said in those cases where decidability of Λ is proved using some kind of finite model property (perhaps in combination with a finite or recursive axiomatizability result). In such cases, some suitable combination of the Propositions 7.2 and 5.5 can be used to prove the decidability of Λ sim , in a straightforward manner. We leave the details to the reader.
4. Table 1 does not mention any kind of interpolation property. Note that in our local paradigm, the relevant notion is that of Craig's interpolation property or cip. A logic Λ has this property if for every pair of formulas ϕ and ψ such that Λ ϕ → ψ there is an interpolant; that is, a formula θ such that Λ ϕ → θ and Λ θ → ψ, while θ may only use proposition letters that occur in both ϕ and ψ. Using the algebraic counterpart of this property, viz. the superamalgamation property, it is fairly easy to show that our simulation map reflects cip. We also have strong reasons to believe that (·) sim preserves this property, but we hope to report on this at some other occasion.
5. Finally, we leave a study of the structural properties of the lattice of extensions of Sim as a matter of further research.
In the remainder of this section we prove some of the easier results listed in Table 1 .
Easy preservation results
We first see how we can find axiomatizations for Λ sim given axiomatizations for Λ. The following result states that if Γ ⊆ L 3 axiomatizes a L ∇ -logic Λ, then Λ sim is axiomatized over Sim by Γ 3 .
Hence, if a L ∇ -logic Λ has a finite, recursive or Sahlqvist axiomatization, respectively, then so has Λ sim .
Note that since our translation map (·) 3 is linear, it follows that if Λ has a finite axiomatization Γ, the size of the axiomatization Sim.Γ 3 , measured as the sum of the length of the axioms, is linear in the size of Γ.
Proof. We first prove (4); let Λ denote the logic K ∇ .Γ. In order to show that Λ sim = Sim.Γ 3 , by the general completeness result of modal logics with respect to descriptive general frames, it suffices to prove that for every descriptive general L 3 -frame G we have the following equivalence:
In order to prove the left to right direction of (5), let G be a descriptive general L 3 -frame such that G Λ sim . It follows immediately from the definition of Λ sim that G Sim, so by Proposition 4.12, G is based on a Sim-frame. Hence, the unsimulation of G is defined. From G Λ sim and (3) it follows that G Λ 3 ; in particular this gives that G Γ 3 since Γ 3 ⊆ Λ 3 .
For the other direction, assume that G Sim.Γ 3 . It follows from G Sim and Proposition 4.12 that G is based on a Sim-frame, whence G • is defined. From G Γ 3 and Proposition 4.17 we obtain that G • Γ. Since Γ axiomatizes Λ this gives that G • Λ, whence G belongs to the class (D Λ ) . Thus by definition of Λ sim we have that G Λ sim .
The second part of the proposition is immediate from (4) . qed
The second 'easy' preservation result concerns first-order definability: we will prove that if Λ defines an elementary class of frames, then so does Λ sim . Let L 
Here we use B(x) as an abbreviation for the L fo 3 -formula ¬∃y R 0 xy; clearly, B(x) indicates that x is a base point.
For a set Σ of L fo ∇ -formulas, we let Σ e denote the set {σ e | σ ∈ Σ}. ¡
∇ -formulas axiomatizes the class of L ∇ -frames for Λ, then the set Sim ∪ Σ e axiomatizes the class of L 3 -frames for Λ sim .
Hence, if Λ is elementary (∆-elementary), then so is Λ sim .
Proof. The key part of the proof is to show that for any Sim-frame F and any assignment b mapping variables to base points of F, we have for every L fo ∇ -formula α:
The proof of (6) is by a straightforward induction on the complexity of α.
Given (6), the proposition follows from the following chain of equivalences, which hold for every L 3 -frame F:
F is a frame for Λ sim iff (Prop. 5.5) F Sim and F Λ 3 , iff (Prop. 4.7)
F Sim and F • Λ, iff (assumption) F Sim and F • |= Σ, iff (Prop. 4.12) F |= Sim and F • |= Σ, iff (6) F |= Sim and F |= Σ e . qed
The final preservation result that we prove in this section concerns canonicity.
Proof. Assume that Λ is a canonical L ∇ -logic, and take a descriptive general L 3 -frame G such that G Λ sim . We will show that F Λ sim , where F is the underlying frame of G.
To start with, it follows from the descriptiveness of G, the inclusion Sim ⊆ Λ sim and the canonicity of Sim, that F Sim, whence F is a Sim-frame. Hence, the unsimulation operation is defined for G. It follows from Proposition 4.17 that G • Λ, and from Proposition 4.18 that G • is descriptive; hence, from the canonicity of Λ we may infer that Λ holds on the underlying frame F • of G • . But then it follows from Proposition 3.5 that F Λ 3 , so by Proposition 5.5 we have that F Λ sim . qed
Easy reflection results
In this subsection we state and prove three reflection result. Reflection of decidability is almost immediate. Let Λ-membership be the problem whether a given formula ϕ (of the appropriate similarity type) belongs to Λ.
Proposition 5.9 Let Λ be an L ∇ -logic. Then there is a linear time reduction of the Λ-membership problem to the Λ sim -membership problem. Hence, if Λ sim is decidable, then so is Λ.
Proof. Immediate by the Simulation Theorem and the fact that the translation (·) 3 can be computed in linear time. qed
The second poperty we treat here concerns completeness and the finite model property.
Proposition 5.10 Let Λ be an L ∇ -logic, and C a class of L 3 -frames. If Λ sim is complete with respect to C, then Λ is complete with respect to C • . Hence, if Λ sim is complete, then so is Λ, and if Λ sim has the finite model property, then so does Λ.
Proof. Let Λ and C be as in the formulation of the proposition, and assume that Λ sim = Th 3 (C • ). It follows from the following chain of equivalences that Λ = Th ∇ (C):
The last proposition of this section states that the simulation operation reflects canonicity.
Proposition 5.11
Let Λ be an L ∇ -logic. If Λ sim is canonical, then so is Λ.
Proof. Assume that Λ is an L ∇ -logic such that Λ sim is canonical. In order to prove that Λ itself is canonical, consider an arbitrary descriptive general L ∇ -frame G such that G Λ. We will show that Λ holds as well on the underlying frame F of G. Using the Propositions 3.8 and 5.5 we obtain that G • Λ sim . Moreover, from Proposition 3.9 it follows that G • is descriptive. Since Λ sim is canonical we find that F • Λ sim , so Proposition 3.5 gives that F Λ. qed
Normal forms
In the following two sections we will be dealing with syntactic issues concerning L 3 -formulas. Much of our considerations will be made simpler because we may assume that L 3 -formulas are in a certain syntactic shape, viz., in normal form. In this section we will define these normal forms and prove that every L 3 -formula can be effectively rewritten into an equivalent formula in normal form.
Recall that we use the symbol m to denote the L 3 -formula Q 0 , and that this formula is true precisely at the middle points of any L 3 -model. Definition 6.1 A formula of L 3 is said to be a propositional list if it is a conjunction of propositional variables and negations of propositional variables. A formula of L 3 is said to be in base normal form or a bnf-formula if it is a propositional formula, a Boolean combination of formulas in base normal form, or of the form
with π a propositional list and θ 1 and θ 2 bnf-formulas. The depth of a bnf-formula is defined using the above inductive definition: depth(p) = 0, depth(¬θ) = depth(θ), depth(θ 1 ∧ θ 2 ) = max(depth(θ 1 ), depth(θ 2 )) and
An L 3 -formula is in middle normal form or an mnf-formula if it is of the form Q i θ with i ∈ {0, 1, 2} and θ a bnf-formula. Finally, a L 3 -formula is in normal form if it has the shape
where all the π formulas are propositional lists, all the θ formulas are in base normal form, and J is some finite index set. We call the formula b ∧ θ 0 the base disjunct or b-disjunct of (7), and the other disjunct, the m-disjunct. ¡ Proposition 6.2 1. There is an effective procedure that rewrites any L 3 -formula into a Sim-equivalent formula which is a boolean combination of bnf-formulas and mnfformulas.
2. There is an effective procedure (·) n that rewrites any L 3 -formula ϕ into a Sim-equivalent formula ϕ n which is in normal form.
Proof. Throughout the proof we will work modulo the logic Sim; that is, 'equivalent' will always mean 'equivalent in Sim'. We first show how to prove the second part of the proposition from the first one. That is, we will prove how any Boolean combination of bnf-and mnf-formulas can be effectively rewritten into normal form. Let ϕ be such a Boolean combination; rewrite ϕ as a disjunction of conjunctions of proposition letters, bnf-formulas in the shape Q s (π ∧ Q 1 θ 1 ∧ Q 2 θ 2 ), mnfformulas, and negations of such formulas. Without loss of generality we may assume that every disjunct has either m or b as a conjunct (any disjunct ψ that would not have such a conjunct may be split into (ψ ∧ m) ∨ (ψ ∧ b)).
First consider the disjuncts containing b. Observe that any formula of the form b∧Q i χ∧γ is Sim-inconsistent, and that any formula of the form b∧P i χ∧γ is equivalent to b∧γ. (Readers having suspicions about these claims are advised to prove them using the Completeness of Sim with respect to the class of Sim-frames, see Proposition 4.13). Use these observations to replace each b-disjunct with a formula of the form b ∧ θ k , with each θ k being a conjunction of proposition letters, bnf-formulas in the form Q s (π ∧ Q 1 θ 1 ∧ Q 2 θ 2 ), and negations of such formulas. Clearly then, each θ k is a bnf-formula. Now group together all these disjuncts and take out the b conjunct, obtaining the equivalent formula b ∧ k θ k which will form the base disjunct of the normal form of ϕ. Now we can turn to the disjuncts containing m as a conjunct. Consider an arbitrary such disjunct, say m ∧ δ. All we need to know about δ is that it is a conjunction of proposition letters, mnf-formulas, formulas of the form Q s θ, and negations of such formulas. We will step by step simplify δ using the following Sim-equivalences (here, as always, i is one of the indices in {0, 1, 2}):
What we are left with in the end is a disjunct of the form m ∧ δ with δ a conjunction of (negated) proposition letters and formulas in middle normal form. Then we may use the fact that the Q i -diamonds distribute over conjunctions to rewrite m ∧ δ into a formula of the form m ∧ π j ∧ Q 0 θ 0,j ∧ Q 1 θ 1,j ∧ Q 2 θ 2,j with π j being a propositional list, and each θ in bnf-form. Finally, grouping all the m-disjuncts together in the same way as we did with the b-disjuncts, we find an m-disjunct of the form m
Clearly, ϕ is equivalent to the disjunction of these two formulas; that is, ϕ is in normal form.
The first part of the proposition is proved by a straightforward formula induction. The base step and the boolean cases of the induction step are straightforward, so assume that ϕ is of the form Qψ, where Q is one of the diamonds of the language L 3 . By the inductive hypothesis we may assume that ψ is in normal form, say, ψ is the formula (7).
First suppose that Q is one of the diamonds Q i , with i ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Since Q i distributes over disjunctions, it suffices to look at each of the two disjuncts of (7) separately. Treating the base disjunct (b ∧ θ 0 ) first, it is easy to see that Q i (b ∧ θ 0 ) is equivalent to the formula Q i θ 0 , a formula is in mnf-form. Now consider the m-disjunct of (7). It easily follows from the Sim-axiom P i P j ⊥ that for any χ, the formula Q i (m ∧ χ) is equivalent to ⊥. From these observations it follows that ϕ is equivalent to the formula Q i θ 0 ∨ ⊥, and hence, to b ∧ Q i θ 0 which meets the requirements. Now suppose that Q is the diamond Q s . Again, it suffices to look at each of the two disjuncts of (7) separately. Using the Sim-theorem Q s b ↔ ⊥ one easily sees that Q s (b ∧ θ 0 ) is equivalent to ⊥, whence we may turn to the m-disjunct of (7). We first rewrite this into the equivalent
now distribute Q s over j , and treat each of the new disjuncts separately. Using the completeness theorem for Sim with respect to the class of simulation frames (Proposition 4.13), it is not difficult to prove that
From this it follows that Q s ψ is equivalent to the formula
which is clearly in bnf-form. Finally, we find that ϕ = Q s ψ is equivalent to the formula b ∧ j (θ 0,j ∧ Q s (π j ∧ Q 1 θ 1,j ∧ Q 2 θ 2,j )) which is in normal form. qed
Preservation of completeness
This section will be devoted to the fairly involved proofs concerning the preservation of completeness properties by our simulation map. In the first subsection we concentrate on frame completeness and the finite model property, in the second part we discuss completeness with respect to classes of general frames.
Frame completeness
In order to make the statement concerning the preservation of frame completeness a bit more precise we need the following definition.
Definition 7.1 An Sim-frame is middle finite if there are at most finitely many middle points in between any triple of base points. Given a class C of L ∇ -frames, we define C mf to be the class of middle finite Sim-frames F such that F • belongs to C. ¡
Recall that a logic has the (strong) finite model property if every formula which is satisfiable in a model based on a frame for Λ is satisfiable in a finite model based on a frame for Λ (of which the size is recursively bounded by the size of the formula). Proposition 7.2 Let Λ be a L ∇ -logic which is complete with respect to a class C of L ∇ -frames. Then Λ sim is complete for C mf . Hence, if Λ has the (strong) finite model property, then so does Λ sim .
The entire subsection is devoted to a proof of Proposition 7.2. Observe that the result concerning the finite model property follows from the main statement in the proposition and the fact that if C is a class of finite frames, then so is C mf . To obtain the preservation of the strong finite model property, a close inspection of the proof below reveals that the number of middle points present between any triple of base points in the C mf -frame constructed, is bounded by the size of the formula that we want to satisfy in C mf .
The aim of our proof is to show that any Λ sim -consistent formula is satisfiable in C mf . It follows from the proposition below that without loss of generality we may assume that the formula at stake is of the form b ∧ θ with θ in base normal form. Proposition 7.3 Let γ be an L 3 -formula. Then there is a bnf-formula θ such that
Proof. Since the formula γ n is equivalent to γ on the basis of Sim, we may work with γ n instead of with γ. Suppose that γ n is of the form (7). We claim that the formula
which clearly is in base normal form, satisfies the required properties. This follows from the fact that for any L 3 -model M based on a Sim-frame, we have that γ n is satisfiable in M iff θ is satisfiable at a base point of M. (8) In order to prove (8) , first suppose that γ n is satisfiable in M, say at the point w. If w is a base point, this means that M, w θ 0 , from which it is immediate that M, w θ. If, on the other hand, w is a middle point, then we have that M, w π j ∧ Q 0 θ 0,j ∧ Q 1 θ 1,j ∧ Q 2 θ 2,j for some j. In this case, recall that r 0 w is the (unique) R 0 -successor of w. It is easy to see that M, r 0 w θ 0,j ∧ Q s (π j ∧ Q 1 θ 1,j ∧ Q 2 θ 2,j ), which makes that M, r 0 w θ.
For the other direction, suppose that θ is satisfiable at the base point w in M. If M, w θ 0 it follows immediately that M, w γ n , so suppose that for some j we have that M, u θ 0,j ∧ Q s (π j ∧ Q 1 θ 1,j ∧ Q 2 θ 2,j ). By the truth definition there must be a middle point m such that wSm and M, m π j ∧ Q 1 θ 1,j ∧ Q 2 θ 2,j . It then follows from wSm and M, w θ 0,j that M, m π j ∧ Q 0 θ 0,j ∧ Q 1 θ 1,j ∧ Q 2 θ 2,j which immediately gives that M, m γ n . This proves (8) and thus concludes the proof of the proposition. qed
For the remainder of the section we fix a formula θ in base normal form such that b ∧ θ is Λ sim -consistent; we will prove that there is a frame F in C mf in which b ∧ θ is satisfiable. Let Θ be the collection of those subformulas of θ that are in base normal form; clearly, Θ is finite.
The idea of our proof is as follows. From the consistency of b ∧ θ we may infer that θ holds at some base point Γ of the canonical Λ sim -model. We will unravel this canonical model from Γ and gather some information concerning an initial part of this unraveled tree model; this information will be encoded in L ∇ -formulas, but in order to obtain sufficient information we have to expand the language with new proposition letters. The formula χ r that we can thus associate with the root of the unraveled, expanded model, will be Λ-consistent, and thus by assumption satisfiable in some frame F that that belongs to C. Finally, we will use this frame F to construct a frame F such that F • = F and in which θ is satisfiable.
First, we introduce some notational conventions. For a set of formulas Σ and a point s in a model M, we define Σ s = {ϕ ∈ Σ | M, s ϕ} as the set of formulas in Σ that hold at s. In words, Ω A|B says that of the formulas in B, precisely those in A are true. Note that it follows that for any set of formulas Σ and any point s in any model M we have that M, s Ω Σs|Σ .
Since b ∧ θ is Λ sim -consistent, the formula θ is satisfied at some base point Γ in the canonical model. Let N = (N, S, R 0 , R 1 , R 2 , V ) be the unravelling of the canonical model from this state Γ, cf. Definition 4.8. It easily follows from the properties of unravellings (cf. Proposition 4.9) that N itself is a model for Λ sim ; that N is based on a Sim-frame; and that its root r satisfies θ.
We need some terminology concerning points in N . The height of a base point s in N is simply the distance from r to s (measured in number of S • R i -steps). A base point is near r if its height does not exceed the depth of θ (as defined in Definition 6.1); a middle point is near r if its immediate base successors are near r. Let N − be the set of points in N that are near r. N − is not necessarily finite since N will generally not be finitely branching. We say that a base point s is on the edge of N − , or briefly: on the edge, if height(s) = depth(θ). Note that 'being on the edge of N − ' is not the same notion as 'having no successors in N '.
We now extend the language, as follows. Let P = {p 1 , . . . , p n } be the finite set of propositional letters occurring in θ; we will use the letter p to refer to a generic element of P . Let Q = {q (I,Θ 1 ,Θ 2 ) | I ⊆ P, Θ i ⊆ Θ} be a set of new propositional letters; observe that Q is finite. We will use the letter q to refer to a generic element of Q.
The idea underlying our use of the proposition letter q (I,Θ 1 ,Θ 2 ) is the following. In our proof we will need to transfer the information provided by L 3 -formulas into the language L ∇ . It is obvious that in a bnf-formula of the form Q s (π ∧ Q 1 θ 1 ∧ Q 2 θ 2 ), the propositional information stored in π is relevant. Unfortunately, there is no direct way to transfer this information to L ∇ since in L ∇ there is no access to middle points. Even if θ 1 and θ 2 are the translations of L ∇ -formulas, say of ψ 1 and ψ 2 , respectively, then the formula ∇(ψ 1 , ψ 2 ) would be as close as we could get; however, in its translation (∇(ψ 1 , ψ 2 ) t = Q s (Q 1 θ 1 ∧ Q 2 θ 2 ) all propositional information about middle points is lost. It is here that the new propositional variables come in: the idea is simply to encode all relevant information (relevant in the sense of pertaining to subformulas of θ) into the q variables. To be a bit more precise, the variable q (I,Θ 1 ,Θ 2 ) should be read as the encoding of the formula
The model N will be expanded to this new language, by defining the valuation V : P ∪ Q → P(N ) as follows:
The following lemma shows that even in the expanded language we are still dealing with a model for Λ sim at the root of which the formula b ∧ θ holds, while we have indeed encoded sufficient relevant information in the new propositional variables.
Proposition 7.4
Let N be the model (N, S, R 1 , R 2 , V ).
1. N is a model for Λ sim .
2. Let u and v be two base points in N . Then P u = P v and Q u = Q v only if Θ u = Θ v .
3. The formula b ∧ θ holds at the root r of N .
Proof. For the first part of the proposition, consider a formula ψ in Λ sim , and an arbitrary point v in N . For each L 3 -formula χ, let χ be the formula obtained from χ by uniformly substituting each variable q (I,Θ 1 ,Θ 2 ) by the formula Q s (Ω I|P ∧ Q 1 Ω Θ 1 |Θ ∧ Q 2 Ω Θ 2 |Θ ). Since ψ then belongs to Λ sim as well, and all variables in ψ are in P , we must have that N , v ψ . However, an easy inductive proof shows that our definition of V ensures that for every L 3 -formula χ and every point w in N we have N , w χ iff N , w χ.
From this it is immediate that N , v ψ, which proves the first part of the proposition.
For part 2, suppose that u and v are base points in N such that P u = P v and Q u = Q v ; that is, u and v agree on the truth of all proposition letters. We prove by induction on the complexity of bnf-formulas that for each formula ψ in Θ we have that N , u ψ iff N , v ψ. First suppose that ψ is a proposition letter; this means that ψ is an element of P . But then we obtain the desired result from the assumption that P u = P v . The Boolean case of the induction step is easy and left to the reader. Now assume that ψ is of the form
. It follows immediately that π is a propositional list and that each ψ i belongs to Θ. By symmetry it suffices to prove that N , u ψ only if N , v ψ. (9) Assume that N , u ψ. Then there are a middle point m and base points u 1 , u 2 such that Sum, R i mu i , N , m π and N , u i ψ i . Recall that P m denotes the set of propositional variables in P that are true at m, and that Θ u i is the set of formulas in Θ true of u i . Obviously, we have that N , m Ω Pm|P ∧ Q 1 Ω Θu 1 |Θ ∧ Q 2 Ω Θu 2 |Θ . It follows by definition of V that N , u q (Pm,Θu 1 ,Θu 2 ) , so by assumption this proposition letter holds at v as well. Hence, there are a middle point k and base points v 1 and v 2 such that SvK, R i kv i , N , k Ω Pm|P and N , v i Ω Θu i |Θ . It is straightforward to prove that this implies N , k π and N , v i ψ i . From this it is immediate that N , v ψ. This proves (9) and thus finishes the proof of the second part of the proposition.
Finally, the last part of the proposition is immediate by the fact that θ only uses old proposition letters, and for these we have that V (p) = V (p). Thus the truth of θ is not affected by moving from N to N . qed
Now we can work towards the L ∇ -logic Λ. With each base point u in N − we will associate a characteristic L ∇ -formula χ u : this formula is supposed to give a description of u in terms of L ∇ -formulas. These formulas are defined by a downward induction on the height of u. The idea is that the closer we get to the root of N , the more information we need to gather; hence, the complexity (in terms of ∇-depth) of χ u will increase as we move towards the root of N .
If u is on the edge of N − we define
that is, we only need propositional information for points on the edge. Now assume that u is a base point in N − of height less than depth(θ). We will define χ u as the conjunction of four formulas, of which the third and fourth require some explanation and introduction. The well-definedness of these two conjuncts (and thus, of χ u ) will be based on the inductive assumption that for all points v of greater height than u, the formula χ v has been defined and depth(χ v ) ≤ depth(θ) − height(v). Clearly this is true for any point v on the edge. Let C(u) = {(w 1 , w 2 ) | ∃m(Swm ∧ R 1 mw 1 ∧ R 2 mw 2 )} be the set of pairs of base successors of w. Define
It follows from the inductive assumption and the fact that the collection P ∪Q of propositional variables is finite, that A u is finite although C(u) may be infinite. Now define, for any finite set A = {(α i , β i ) | i ∈ I} of pairs of L ∇ -formulas, the formula σ A as follows:
The meaning of this formula is expressed by the following lemma.
, and let r be a point in M. Then M, r σ A if and only if for all pairs of points s, t such that T rst, there is some i ∈ I such that M, s α i and M, t β i .
Proof. Assume that A, M and r are as in the statement of the proposition. For the direction from left to right, assume that M, r σ A and that s and t are points such that T rst. First take J = I. Then M, r ∆( j∈I α j , i∈∅ β i ) implies (by the definition of ∆) that M, s α j for some j ∈ I or else M, t ⊥. Thus we find that M, s α j for some j ∈ I. Hence, if we define J 0 = {j ∈ I | M, s α j }, we clearly have that J 0 is distinct from I. But it follows from M, r ∆( j∈J 0 α j , i∈I\J 0 β i ) and M, s ¬ j∈J 0 α j that M, t i∈I\J 0 β i . This implies that there is some i ∈ J 0 such that t β i . By definition of J 0 we also have s α i , so clearly this is the (kind of) i that we were looking for.
For the other direction, suppose that for all pairs of points s, t such that T rst, there is some i ∈ I such that M, s α i and M, t β i . In order to prove that M, r σ A , let J be an arbitrary subset of I, and let s and t be arbitrary points such that T rst. Let i ∈ I be the index such that M, s α i and M, t β i . Hence, if i belongs to J we obtain that s j∈J α j , while if i ∈ J we find that t i∈I\J β i . In either case, we have shown that s j∈J α j or t i∈I\J β i . This suffices to prove that M, r ∆( j∈J α j , i∈I\J β i ), and thus, that M, r σ A . qed
Now that we have established this, we are ready for the definition of χ u . Define the following formulas:
It is clear from this definition that the ∇-depth of χ u is at most one higher than the highest depth of the formula associated with any of its immediate successors; hence, we have that depth(χ u ) ≤ depth(θ) − height(u), so the inductive assumption will remain valid.
C(u) may be empty -this indicates that u is a blind world in the tree N , that is, it does not have any successor. For such a blind world the third conjunct of χ u simply boils down to ∆(⊥, ⊥).
The following proposition shows that the characteristic formulas are at least correct descriptions. Proposition 7.6 For each base point w in N − we have that N , w χ 3 w .
Proof. By a straightforward downward induction on the height of w. qed
The last proposition takes us into an area where we may use the assumed completeness of Λ. For, it follows from Proposition 7.6 that N , r χ 3 r . But since N is a model for Λ sim this means that χ 3 r is Λ sim -consistent. Thus, it follows from the Simulation Theorem that χ r is Λ-consistent. Hence, by completeness of Λ with respect to the frame class C, we may infer that χ r is satisfiable in C -in fact, the same holds for all the χ w 's.
Let F = (F, T ) in C be a frame in which χ r is satisfiable; that is, for some w 0 ∈ F and some valuation U we have that F, U, w 0 χ r .
It follows from Proposition 3.5 that χ 3 r is satisfiable in F • , but this is of marginal interest only. What we are after is a C mf -frame F in which θ will turn out to be satisfiable. Analogous to our definition of F • we will obtain F from F by adding middle points; the difference with F • will be that for a triple (s 0 , s 1 , s 2 ) in T we may now want to add several middle points. To determine the number and names of these middle points we turn to the points in N − for information.
Let t = (t 0 , t 1 , t 2 ) be a triple of points in F such that T t 0 t 1 t 2 , and let m be a middle point in N − . We say that t resembles m if F, U, t i χ r i m for each i (the partial maps r i were given in definition 4.2). The point m is minimal for t if t resembles m while t resembles no m with P m = P m that is closer to the root of N (more formally, this condition can be expressed by requiring that there is no m with P m = P m such that height(r 0 m ) < height(r 0 m)).
In order to give a formal definition of F , we first associate a set X t with each triple t ∈ T . For an arbitrary such triple t = (t 0 , t 1 , t 2 ), distinguish the following cases.
• If t resembles no middle point in N − , then define X t to be some singleton set, say,
• If on the other hand, t does resemble some middle point in N − , then put
The idea will be that each element a of X t determines one middle point that we insert between t 0 , t 1 and t 2 , and that we will make a variable p true at such a middle point (t, a) if the first coordinate of a is a set of propositional variables that tells us to do so.
Formally, the frame F = (W , S , R 0 , R 1 , R 2 ) and the valuation U will be obtained from the frame F and the valuation U as follows.
The following proposition ensures that F indeed belongs to the class C mf and that with respect to translated L ∇ -formulas, F and U display the right behaviour.
Hence, F belongs to the class C mf .
2. For each base point t 0 of F and each L ∇ -formula ψ we have
3. As a corollary, we have that F , U , w 0 χ 3 r .
Proof. The first part is immediate from the definitions and the fact that, for each t ∈ T , the set X t is finite. Part 2 then follows from Proposition 4.6, while the last part of the proposition is an immediate consequence of Proposition 7.6. qed
However, we already mentioned that it is not enough to prove that χ 3 r is satisfiable in F : we want to prove that our original formula b ∧ θ is satisfied in F . It is here that the characteristic formulas χ u are of crucial importance. Roughly speaking, we will show that whenever F , U , s χ u , then s (in (F , U )) and u (in N ) satisfy the same formulas in Θ, up to a certain depth. More precisely, we will establish the following result.
Proposition 7.8 Let s be a point in F , U and let u be a base point in N − such that F, U, s χ u . Then for all formulas ψ in Θ we have that N , u ψ iff F , U , s ψ, (11) provided that height(u) + depth(ψ) ≤ depth(θ).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of ψ (as a bnf-formula). If ψ is propositional, then (11) is immediate by the fact that F, U, s χ u implies that s in (F , U ) and u in N satisfy the same P -variables. The Boolean cases of the inductive step are trivial. Hence, by our definition of Θ as being a set of bnf-formulas, we may restrict our attention to the case that ψ is of the form Q s (π ∧ Q 1 ψ 1 ∧ Q 2 ψ 2 ). Assume that height(u) + depth(ψ) ≤ depth(θ).
Since depth(ψ) > 0, this means in particular that we may assume that height(u) < depth(θ); that is, u is off the edge of N − . It is convenient for us to write t 0 instead of s. We will prove that
First assume that N , u ψ. Then there are a middle point m and base points u 1 and u 2 in N such that Sum, N , m π and R i mu i , N , v i ψ i for i = 1, 2.
Since u if off the edge, χ u has a conjunct of the form χ 3 u = (w 1 ,w 2 )∈C(u) ∇(χ w 1 , χ w 2 ). Hence, it follows from F, U, t 0 χ u that F, U, t 0 ∇ (χ v 1 , χ v 2 ). This means that there must be points t 1 and t 2 in F such that T t 0 t 1 t 2 and F, U, t i χ v i for i = 1, 2. Thus t = (t 0 , t 1 , t 2 ) resembles m. Also, for i = 1, 2 we may apply the inductive hypothesis to the formula ψ i , with respect to the points t i and v i . For, while the height of v i is one bigger than that of u, the depth of ψ i is at least one smaller than that of ψ; this means that height(v i ) + depth(ψ i ) ≤ depth(θ), as required for applying the inductive hypothesis. This yields that F , U , t i ψ i , for each i.
Moreover, by definition of F , between t 0 , t 1 and t 2 there must be a middle point k = (t, a) such that a ∈ X t is of the form (P m , Θ v 1 , Θ v 2 ) with P m = P m . (Note that a need not necessarily be of the form (P m , Θ v 1 , Θ v 2 ); it may be of the form a = (P m , Θ r 1 m , Θ r 2 m ) such that m is closer to the root r of N than m. However, there must be at least one a ∈ X t of the described form, i.e., with P m = P m .) Then by definition of U we know that t in F and m in N make precisely the same P -variables true, so from N , m π if is immediate that F , U , t π. Hence we may conclude that indeed F , U , t 0 ψ.
For the other direction, assume that F , U , t 0 ψ. Then there are a middle point k and base points t 1 and t 2 such that St 0 k, R i kt i , F , U , k π and F , U , t i ψ i for i = 1, 2. From the definition of F it follows that in F we must have T t 0 t 1 t 2 .
By Proposition 7.5 it follows from F , U , t 0 χ 3 u that there are points v 1 and v 2 in N such that (v 1 , v 2 ) ∈ C(u), F , U , t 1 χ v 1 and F , U , t 2 χ v 2 . Hence, t = (t 0 , t 1 , t 2 ) resembles the (unique) middle point m of u, v 1 and v 2 .
Hence, by definition of F , the point k must be of the form k = (t, (P m , Θ r 1 m , Θ r 2 m )) where m is such that t resembles m , P m = P m and height(r 0 m ) ≤ height(u). Abbreviate u = r 0 m ; since t resembles m we have that F , U , t 0 χ u . By our assumption that F , U , t 0 χ u and the definition of the characteristic formulas, it follows that u and u agree on the truth of all proposition letters. Hence, by part 2 of Proposition 7.4, u and u agree on the truth of all formulas in Θ. Thus, it suffices to prove that N , u ψ. From the fact that u and u agree on all proposition letters we may draw another interesting conclusion, namely, that N , u q (Pm,Θv 1 ,Θv 2 ) . By definition of the valuation V in N , this implies that there are base points w 1 , w 2 and a middle point n in N such that Su n, R i nw i , P n = P m and Θ w i = Θ v i . Since for each i, we have that height(w i ) + depth(ψ i ) ≤ (height(u )+1)+(depth(ψ)−1) = height(u )+depth(ψ) ≤ height(u)+depth(ψ) ≤ depth(θ), we may apply, for i = 1, 2, the inductive hypothesis to ψ i , for the points s i and w i , respectively. This gives that N , w i ψ i .
Also, from the fact that P n = P m = P m and the definition of U we may infer that k and m agree on the truth of all proposition letters in P ; hence, we find that N , n π.
From this it is immediate that N , u ψ, and from our earlier observation this gives that N , u ψ, as required. This proves (11) and thus finishes the proof of the proposition. qed From the above propositions it is immediate that F , U , w 0 b ∧ θ, which shows that indeed, the formula b ∧ θ is satisfiable in the class C mf . This finishes the proof of Proposition 7.2.
Preservation of general completeness
In this subsection we discuss a preservation result concerning completeness with respect to classes of descriptive general frames. Recall that we needed this result in order to show that (·) sim distributes over meets of logics, cf. the proof of Theorem 5.4. Proposition 7.9 Let Λ be a L ∇ -logic which is complete with respect to a class C of descriptive general L ∇ -frames. Then Λ sim is complete for C .
Proof. Since the proof of this proposition is a variation on the proof of Proposition 7.2, we allow ourselves to be fairly sketchy. We will show that for an arbitrary bnf-formula θ such that b ∧ θ is Λ sim -consistent, we can satisfy θ in a descriptive general frame that belongs to C .
Copying the proof of Proposition 7.2 and using its definitions and notation, we arrive at a descriptive general frame G = (F, A) which belongs to C and in which the formula χ r can be satisfied under some admissible valuation U . We will define a descriptive general Sim-frame G such that G • = G and in which θ is satisfiable under an admissible valuation U . The definition of G will be a 'multiple middle point' version of G • , in much the same way that we defined F as a variation on F • . The frame F underlying G will indeed look very much like F , but it will not be exactly the same: in F we cannot have two distinct middle points of the form (t, x) and (t, x ) that make the same proposition letters true.
Formally, we will define F as follows. Let T 1 be the set of triples t ∈ T that resemble some middle point m in N − , and define T 2 = T \ T 1 . Observe that a triple t ∈ T belongs to T 1 if and only if for some middle point m in N − we have that F, U, t i χ r i m for each i. Since there are only finitely many formulas of the form χ u , and since U is an admissible valuation in G, this shows that in G • the set T 1 (and hence, also T 2 ) is admissible.
Define, for any t ∈ T :
Now we can define the frame F = (W , S , R 0 , R 1 , R 2 ) and the valuation U as follows.
It is easy to see that the model (F , U ) is in fact a bounded morphic image of (F , U ) under the map that identifies middle points which make the same proposition letters true. From this it is immediate that the formula b ∧ θ is satisfiable in (F , U ) . Now, to complete the definition of G , we call a subset of W admissible if it is of the form a ∪ b ∪ c with: a ⊆ W is an admissible set of G; c ⊆ T 2 is such that {t ∈ T | (t, * ) ∈ c} is admissible in G • ; and b is of the form T 1 ∩ U (π) for some propositional formula π.
We first show that G = (F , A ) is a general frame. The only non-trivial part of this proof is to show that A is closed under the operation m s . Consider an arbitrary element a ∪ b ∪ c of A , with a, b and c as described above. Clearly we have that m s (a ∪ b ∪ c) = m s b ∪ m s c. It is not hard to see that m s c belongs to A, whence it is admissible in G . In order to prove that b = T 1 ∩ U (π) is admissible we have to work harder. The crucial observation, which we leave for the reader to prove, is that a state w belongs to m s b if and only if there is some point u off the edge of N − such that F, U, w χ u and N , u Q s π. From this observation it follows that m s b is a (finite!) union of sets U (χ u ) and since U is admissible in G this gives that m s b belongs to A .
We also leave it for the reader to verify that G is descriptive; note that for differentiation we need the new definition of X t , in order to show that any two distinct points (t, I) and (t, I ) can be separated by an admissible set of the form T 1 ∩ U (p) for some propositional letter p.
Since it is obvious that G • = G we find by Proposition 4.17 that G Λ sim . And since U is admissible, it follows from the satisfiability of b ∧ θ in G that b ∧ θ is satisfiable in G . This proves that indeed Λ sim is complete with respect to C . qed
Unsimulating a logic
In order to prove reflection results concerning our simulation map, it is useful to define an unsimulation, that is, a function mapping L 3 -logics extending Sim to L ∇ -logics.
Definition 8.1 Let Θ be an L 3 -logic extending Sim. Define Θ sim to be the L ∇ -logic consisting of those L ∇ -formulas that are valid on the class of unsimulations of descriptive general Θ-frames:
The connection between the maps (·) sim and (·) sim is concisely summarized by the following proposition.
Proof. Part 1 of the proposition is immediate from the following chain of equivalences:
Now consider part two of the proposition. First assume that Λ ⊆ Θ sim . Since Λ sim is axiomatized by Λ 3 ∪ Sim and Sim ⊆ Θ by assumption, it suffices to prove that Λ 3 ⊆ Θ. Hence, take an arbitrary ϕ ∈ Λ. By assumption, ϕ belongs to Θ. It follows from part 1 of this proposition that ϕ 3 ∈ Θ. Since ϕ was arbitrary this shows that Λ 3 ⊆ Θ.
For the other direction, assume that Λ sim ⊆ Θ. In order to prove that Λ ⊆ Θ sim , consider an arbitrary formula ϕ in Λ. Since ϕ 3 ∈ Λ sim by Theorem 5.3, we have that ϕ 3 ∈ Θ by our assumption. Thus ϕ belongs to Θ sim by the first part of the Proposition.
Part 3 of the proposition is immediate by part 2 and the observation that Θ sim ⊆ Θ sim . Likewise, the right to left inclusion of part 4 is immediate by part 2 and the fact that Λ sim ⊆ Λ sim . For the other, left to right, inclusion, suppose that ϕ is a theorem of (Λ sim ) sim . It follows from part 1 that ϕ 3 ∈ Λ sim , whence ϕ ∈ Λ by Theorem 5.3. qed
Reflection of axiomatizability
In this subsection we will see how to find an axiomatization for an arbitrary L ∇ -logic Λ on the basis of a given axiomatization for Λ sim . Since Λ is the unsimulation of Λ sim , it will pay off to look at the more general question how we can obtain an axiomatization for the unsimulation Θ sim of an arbitrary L 3 -logic Θ, once we know that Θ is axiomatized by a set of L 3 -formulas Γ. The basic idea underlying our approach is that given an L 3 -formula γ we want to encode its 'effect' on the language L ∇ ; this effect, or residual as we will call it, (notation: Res(γ)) will be defined as a set of L ∇ -formulas that can be obtained effectively from γ. The main technical result of this section (Proposition 8.9) states that if an L 3 -logic Θ is axiomatized by a set of formulas Γ, then the collection γ∈Γ Res(γ) axiomatizes Θ sim . From this it is not very difficult to derive the reflection under (·) sim of finite and recursive axiomatizability. The formal definition of residuals is fairly complicated; let us provide some intuitions first. To start with, when dealing with L 3 -formulas we are hindered by the fact that although semantically there is a clear and useful distinction between base points and middle points, the proposition letters of our language may be interpreted at base points and middle points alike. For some purposes it would be much more convenient if we were working in a sorted modal language in which the proposition letters were separated into two sorts, of base variables and middle variables, respectively.
Remark 8.3
There is no need for formalizing such a sorted version of L 3 , but it might be useful to look at the following definition and observation, which, strictly speaking, are not used further on.
Given a set Var of propositional variables for L 3 , let Var s be the set {p m , p b | p ∈ Var }. For a propositional formula π, let π m (π b ) denote the formula we obtain from π by replacing all occurrences of a proposition letter p by the variable p m (by p b , respectively). For an L 3 -formula in base normal form, say θ, we define its sorted variant θ s by the following induction:
For an L 3 -formula θ in normal form, say, θ is of the form (7), we define θ s to be the formula
Clearly, the idea underlying these definitions is that we replace each 'base occurrence' of a proposition letter p by p b and each 'middle occurrence', by p m . Obviously, L 3 -formulas are not equivalent to their sorted versions, but nevertheless, we can prove that the sorted, normalized version of a collection of formulas axiomatizes the same logic as the set itself. That is, for any set Γ of L 3 -formulas Γ we have that
(Here Γ s = {(γ n ) s | γ ∈ Γ} denotes the collection of sorted variants of the normalized formulas in Γ.)
The second crucial intuition underlying our definition of residuals is based on the requirement that we want Res(γ) to be a set of L ∇ -formulas. This means that we somehow have to get rid of the propositional lists that have 'middle occurrences' within an L 3 -formula in normal form. Our solution to this problem is fairly straightforward, but technically rather involved: the best way to explain it is by saying that first, we simply replace such middle occurrences with suitable substitution instances, and that second, we show that the resulting formulas are equivalent to translated L ∇ -formulas. For each suitable substitution τ we thus obtain a function res τ (·) mapping (normal forms of) L 3 -formulas to L ∇ -formulas. Let us now turn to the technical details. Definition 8.4 A sorting substitution is an L 3 -substitution replacing each propositional variable p with a formula of the form
where J τ p is some finite index set. Given a (sorted) substitution τ and an L 3 -formula γ, let τ (γ) denote the result of applying τ to γ. ¡ As will become more clear when we prove Proposition 8.8, sorted substitutions are the syntactic counterpart of the definition of the collection of admissible sets in a general simulation frame, cf. Definition 3.6.
The following rather technical lemma states that on 'middle occurrences' of a propositional list π, a sorting substitution τ has the effect of 'spreading' the information of π over 'neighboring' base occurrences.
Proposition 8.5
There is an effective procedure which on an input consisting of a propositional list π and a sorting substitution τ , returns a finite set
Note that we do not require the formulas π τ i,k to be substitution instances of π.
Proof. Assume that π is the propositional list
We first consider the positive literals. Suppose that
Obviously then, at middle points, τ (π) is equivalent to the
Our second observations concerns the negative literals of π. Let ¬q be an arbitrary example, and suppose that τ (q) is the formula
At middle points, the negation of this formula is equivalent to j (Q 0 ¬q 0,j ∨Q 1 ¬q 1,j ∨Q 2 ¬q 2,j ).
Hence, using the Boolean distributive laws we can show that at middle points, the formula τ (π) is equivalent to a disjunction k γ k of conjunctions γ k of formulas of the form Q i p and Q i ¬q. Since each diamond Q i distributes over conjunctions (modulo Sim), we can rewrite each of these conjunctions into the form Q 0 π 0,k ∧Q 1 π 1,k ∧Q 2 π 2,k with each π i,k a propositional list. This proves the proposition. qed
Now we have sufficient material to define the residuals.
Definition 8.6 Let τ be a sorting substitution. We first define, by induction to the complexity of bnf-formulas, the untranslation θ τ of an L 3 -formula θ in base normal form:
Of a formula θ in normal form, the τ -residual res τ (θ) is defined as follows. Assume that θ has the form (7):
where all the π formulas are propositional lists and all the θ formulas are in base normal form. Let η i,j,k abbreviate the formula (π j ) τ i,k ∧ θ τ i,j , and let J τ (θ) denote the set {(j, k) | k ∈ K τ,π j }. The residual res τ (θ) is defined as the following formula:
For an arbitrary L 3 -formula γ we define the τ -residual res τ (γ) as the L ∇ -formula res τ (γ n ); that is, as the τ -residual of the normal form of γ.
Finally, we define the residual set of an L 3 -formula γ as the set of L ∇ -formulas Res(γ) = {res τ (γ n ) | τ a sorting substitution }. If Γ is a set of L 3 -formulas, we write Res(Γ) to denote the set γ∈Γ Res(γ)).
¡ Forbidding as these definitions may look, it is not hard to check syntactically that the formula res τ (θ) is at least a well-formed L ∇ -formula. Its meaning should become clear from the (proofs of the) following propositions. Proposition 8.7 Let τ be a sorting substitution, let F be a Sim-frame and let V and V be valuations on F and F • , respectively, such that V (p) = V (τ (p)). Proof. The first part of the proposition follows almost immediately from Proposition 8.5; the details are left to the reader. Part 2 can be proved by a fairly straightforward induction on the complexity of bnfformulas. We will only consider one case of the inductive step, namely, in which θ is of the form Q s (π ∧ Q 1 θ 1 ∧ Q 2 θ 2 ). For the sake of a more concise formulation we write w 0 instead of w.
First suppose that M, w 0 θ. Then there must be a middle point m and base points w 1 and w 2 such that r i m = w i for i = 0, 1, 2, M, m π and M, w i θ i for i = 1, 2. It follows from part 1 of this proposition that there is a k such that for i = 0, 1, 2 we have that M, w i π τ i,k . Also, by the induction hypothesis we have that M, w i θ τ i for i = 1, 2. From these facts it is straightforward to derive that M,
showing that M, w 0 θ τ . The other direction of the equivalence, which can be proved just as easily, is left to the reader.
For the last part of the proposition, we may assume without loss of generality that γ is in normal form, say γ is of the form (7). First assume that F, V γ. In order to prove that
, take an arbitrary point w in W • ; we will show that both conjuncts of θ τ , cf. (14) , hold at w.
First, it follows from F, V γ and the fact that w is a base point that F, V, w θ 0 . Hence, by the second part of the proposition we have that F • , V , w θ τ 0 . This takes care of the first conjunct of θ τ .
In order to show that the second conjunct of θ τ holds at w as well, assume that F • , V , w ∇ . That is, w has T -successors in F • ; hence, w has S-successors in F. For each S-successor m of w, by our assumption on the shape of γ there is some j such that F, V, m π j ∧ Q 0 θ 0,j ∧ Q 1 θ 1,j ∧ Q 2 θ 2,j . By part 1 of this proposition, we may derive from F, V, m π j the existence of a k ∈ K τ,π j such that for each i = 0, 1, 2 we have that F, V, r i m (π j ) τ i,k . Likewise, we may use part 2 of the proposition to infer from F, V, m Q i θ i,j that F • , V , r i m θ τ i,j . Now suppose that we use the same notation as in Definition 8.6 and define L as the set of pairs (j, k) in J τ (θ) such that for each i = 0, 1, 2 we have that F • , V , r i m η i,j,k . It follows from our earlier remarks that L is not empty. Now we claim that
First, take an arbitrary pair (j, k) ∈ L. By definition of L, there is some S-successor m of w such that F • , V , r 0 m η 0,j,k . However, since m is an S-successor of w we have that r i m = w; and since (j, k) was an arbitrary element of L this gives that F • , V , w (j,k)∈L η 0,j,k . Now let v 1 and v 2 be arbitrary base points such that T wv 1 v 2 . By definition of T there must be a middle point m between w, v 1 and v 2 . Thus by definition of L there must be some pair (j, k) ∈ L such that for each i = 1, 2 we have F • , V , v i η i,j,k . But then it follows by Proposition 7.5 that
. Thus we proved (15) and hence, we established that the second conjunct of res τ (γ) holds at w as well. This shows that F • , V , w res τ (γ) and thus finishes the proof of the left to right direction of the last part of the proposition.
In order to finish our proof of part 3, now suppose that F • , V res τ (γ). We will show that F, V γ. To do so, take an arbitrary point in F. Distinguish cases according to the nature of this point.
If the point is a base point, say w, then it follows from F • , V , w res τ (γ) that F • , V , w θ τ 0 , so using the second part of this proposition we obtain that F, V, w θ 0 which immediately gives that F, V, w γ.
If, on the other hand, we are dealing with a middle point, say m, there is more work to do. We first turn to the (unique!) R 0 -successor r 0 m of m; note that it follows from the assumption that F • , V , r 0 m res τ (γ). In particular, this gives that there is some subset
From the latter fact we may infer, using Proposition 7.5, that there is some pair (j, k) ∈ L such that F • , V , r 1 m η 1,j,k and F • , V , r 2 m η 2,j,k . Taking this together with the first fact we may certainly conclude that for some pair (j, k) ∈ L it holds that
Unraveling the definition of η i,j,k we may draw two conclusions. First, for each i ∈ {0, 1, 2} we have F • , V , r i m (π j ) τ i,k , so by the first part of this proposition we may conclude that F, V, m π j . And second, for each i ∈ {0, 1, 2} we have F • , V , r i m θ τ i,j , whence by the second part of this proposition we may infer that for each i = 0, 1, 2, it holds that F, V, r i m θ i,j . All in all, we find that F, V, m π j ∧ Q 0 θ 0,j ∧ Q 1 θ 1,j ∧ Q 2 θ 2,j , which immediately gives that F, V, m θ.
qed Thus we may conclude that G • , V γ. Since V was arbitrary this implies that G • γ. For the other direction, suppose that γ is valid on the descriptive general Sim-frame H. In order to show that H • Res(γ), take an arbitrary sorted substitution τ , and an arbitrary H • -admissible valuation V . Let V be the valuation on the underlying frame of H which is given by V (p) = V (τ (p)). Then obviously, V is admissible on H, whence by assumption we have that H, V γ. It follows by the definition of V that we may apply Proposition 8.7 which yields H • , V res τ (γ). Since both V and τ were arbitrary this shows that H • Res(γ). qed Proposition 8.9 Let Θ be an L ∇ -logic extending Sim. If Θ is axiomatized by Γ, then the set γ∈Γ Res(γ) axiomatizes Θ sim .
Proof. By Proposition 8.2 it suffices to prove that for all L ∇ -formulas ϕ we have the following equivalence:
ϕ ∈ K ∇ .Res(Γ) iff ϕ 3 ∈ Sim.Γ.
For the direction from left to right, suppose that ϕ 3 does not belong to Sim.Γ. Then for some descriptive general Sim-frame G we have that G Γ, G ϕ 3 . It follows from Proposition 8.8 that G • Res(Γ) and from Proposition 4.17 that G • ϕ. But then it is immediate that ϕ does not belong to K ∇ .Res(Γ).
For the other direction, suppose that ϕ ∈ K ∇ .Res(Γ). It follows that there must be a descriptive general L ∇ -frame G such that Res(Γ) is valid on G but ϕ is not. Then by Proposition 8.8 we have that G • Γ while Proposition 3.8 implies that G ϕ 3 . From this it is immediate that ϕ 3 does not belong to Sim.Γ. qed
Using some well known tricks, Proposition 8.9 can be used to show that (·) sim reflects finite and recursive axiomatizability. Proposition 8.10 Let Λ be an L ∇ -logic.
1. If Λ sim is recursively axiomatizable, then so is Λ.
2. If Λ sim is finitely axiomatizable, then so is Λ.
Proof. It is fairly easy to derive from Proposition 8.9 that if Λ sim has a recursive axiomatization, then Λ has a recursively enumerable set of axioms; however, a well known result sometimes called Craig's Lemma implies that then Λ must have a recursive axiomatization as well. Now suppose that Λ sim is finitely axiomatizable; then we may assume that Λ sim is axiomatized over Sim by a single axiom, say, γ. It follows by the previous proposition that Λ = (Λ sim ) sim is axiomatized by the set Res(γ). But then by Proposition 5.5, Λ sim is axiomatized by the set (Res(γ)) 3 = {res τ (γ) 3 | τ a sorting substitution}. Since γ belongs to Λ sim , there must be a derivation of γ from the axioms in (Res(γ)) 3 . Since derivations are finite, only finitely many axioms, say, (res τ 1 (γ)) 3 , . . . , (res τn (γ)) 3 can be involved in this derivation. From this it is not difficult to prove that the set {res τ 1 (γ), . . . , res τn (γ)} axiomatizes Λ. qed
Reflection of first-order definability
In this subsection we will show that if Λ sim defines an elementary class of frames, then so does Λ. That is, we will prove that (·) sim reflects first-order definability. Roughly speaking, the proof of this result is similar to the proof of the corresponding preservation result: we will define a translation (·) e mapping first order L ; the semantic intuition is that these variables will refer to the respective (unique) R 0 -, R 1 -and R 2 -successor of the middle point that y refers to. Now for the technical details.
Definition 8.11
Call a first order formula clean if no variable occurs both free and bound and no two distinct quantifier occurrences bind the same variable.
Suppose that X and Y are two disjoint sets of variables; a clean formula α is called X, Ytranslatable if all of its free variables and none of its bound variables are taken from X ∪ Y .
¡
In the above definition, X and Y are the base and middle variables, respectively. Note that sentences are ∅, ∅-translatable, that each subformula of an X, Y -translatable formula is X, Y -translatable, and that if ∃x α is X, Y -translatable, then α is both X ∪ {x}, Y and X, Y ∪ {x}-translatable. These observations show that the following definition is correct. Given a sentence α, let α e denote the sentence α ∅,∅ . ¡ It is our aim to show that for every L ∇ -frame F it holds that F • |= α e iff F |= α. Since the proof of this statement is based on a formula induction, we need means to compare assignments on F with those on F • . 
We can now state and prove the main technical lemma of this subsection.
Proposition 8.14 Let F be an L ∇ -frame, and let X and Y be two disjoint sets of variables. Let α be an L In particular, if α is a sentence, we may take X and Y to be empty and obtain
Proof. We prove this proposition by induction on the complexity of α.
For the base case of the induction we consider the various atomic formulas separately. First assume that α is of the form x = y. Distinguish cases: The case that α is an atomic formula of the form Sxy is immediate. The boolean cases of the induction step have a straightforward proof, so we concentrate on the case that α is of the form ∃z β. . We leave it for the reader that in the first case we may reverse the reasoning in item 1 above, and similarly for the second case and item 2. In both cases we find a (base, respectively middle) point u in F such that F |= β[b ] where b is the assignment which may differ from β only in mapping z to u. This shows that F |= α [b] . qed Proposition 8.15 Let Λ be an L ∇ -logic. If the class of L 3 -frames for Λ sim is axiomatized by the set Σ of L fo 3 -formulas, then the set Σ e axiomatizes the class of L ∇ -frames for Λ. Hence, if Λ sim is elementary (∆-elementary), then so is Λ.
Proof. Assume that Λ and Σ are as in the statement of the proposition. The proposition follows from the following chain of equivalences:
F Λ iff (Prop's 3.5 and 5.5) F • Λ sim , iff (assumption) F • |= Σ, iff (Proposition 8.14)) F |= Σ e . qed
